Changes in the Balance of Governmental Power by Cooley, Thomas M.
University of Michigan Law School 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository 
Other Publications Faculty Scholarship 
1878 
Changes in the Balance of Governmental Power 
Thomas M. Cooley 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/other/157 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/other 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Legal Education Commons, and the Legal History Commons 
CHANGES IN THE BALANCE
OF
GOVERNMENTAL POWERS,
AN ADDRESS
LAW STUDENTS OF MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY,
MARCH 20, 1878.
By Thomas M. Cooley,
JAY PROFESSOROKLAW.
ANN arbor:
Douglas & Co., Publishers.
STZistt.
>f-*:i
i-" r. .' ----'.
-v;rf. -- ^
CHANGES IN THE BALANCE
GOVERNMENTAL POWER,
AN ADDRESS
LAW STUDENTS OF MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY,
MARCH 20, 1878.
By Thomas M. Cooley,
JAY PROFKSSOROF LAW.
ANN ARBOR:
Douglas & Co., Publishers.
Bentley Historical
Library
Univc^Hv rf Michigan
Ann Arbor Printing and Publishing Comfany.
I - ' '. ' - - -; „_____
!'...... ,: I'''
CHANGES IN THE BALANCE
OF
GOVERNMENTAL POWERS.
In taking up for brief review the action of the convention in
^ framing, and that of the people of the Union in adopting the
^ Federal Constitution ninety years ago, we should be able after
such. a lapse of time, and in view of our diversified experience
^ under it, to deal with it in a spirit of dispassionate criticism, and
without boasting or unreasonable exultation. Yet we may per
ry haps truly say that the act itself was the most notable in govern-
, > ment-making of which history bears record. All the institutions
^ of France have been broken up and reformed again and again as
a result, and in its various revolutions all European governments
have been shattered or disturbed. The influence on England has
been less striking, but nevertheless powerful, and the end cannot
as yet be foreseen. To anticipate what has followed would have
been impossible to any member of the convention ; indeed had it
been possible to foresee the fierce debate that was to arise con
cerning the just theory of the government then being devised, and
the proper constructiou of the written charter then agreed upan
— a debate upon which parties builded, and which ever after
wards agitated the nation until the agitation culminated in civil
war, it is more than probable they would have shrunk back with
dismay, when the instrument was presented for their signatures,
and preferred to such an ordeal the evils then upon them.
"
Nev-
theless to the superficial observer, the task seemed not so difficult
as it was found to be, or as it appears to us now. It was only to
crown a structure the thirteen pillars of which already "stood firm
in their places* and had sustained without yielding the shock of a
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long and destructive war : it was only to knit together more firm
ly thirteen commonwealths, with hands already clasped and
hearts still warm with the recollections of common sufferings and
common sacrifices. It was indeed a simple task compared with
what it would have been to build up a free State from the origi
nal elements, as the French undertook to do a little later, when
they had torn down and trampled in the dust the institutions
which their rulers had made too oppressive for further endurance.
In any just survey of our institutions, however brief or sum
mary, it would be inexcusable to pass by without notice the long
training of the people in self-government. This began with the
settlement of the country, and it prevailed everywhere. The
methods were different : New England had a system closely
approaching a democracy, the Middle States had another, and
the States to the South another; there were differences in the
liberality of the rules of suffrage ; none of the colonies made the
privilege general as now ; but in all it was sufficiently general to
make the people feel that they governed themselves, and to give
to every person an interest in public affairs. It was not merely
the lawyer, the planter, and the merchant who discussed affairs
of government ; these might be the most prominent, the best
informed, and the most influential in any public meeting or hust-
ing-day discussion, but the most humble of their neighbors bold
ly took sides on political questions, and talked freely and earnest
ly if not intelligently upon them. The political interests they
chiefly cared for were seldom or never those which centered in
England ; they were the local interests ; not those which affected
the British empire at large, but those which concerned county
and parish affairs. This gave them a sense of personal responsi
bility in matters of government, and a peaceable, though possibly
a grumbling submission to the will of the people whenever it was
once lawfully declared.
There are two views to be taken of this discipline in self-
government :
i. As it interests the people in the principles of free govern
ment, teaches them what must be its elements and what its dan
gers, and fits them intelligently to act so as to secure the former
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and avoid the latter. This is the view taken by theoretical writ
ers and optimists generally.
2. As it implants in them a habit of self-government, of def
erence and obedience to the constituted authorities, of patient
endurance of abuses until they can be regularly reformed, and a
firm trust that they are to be reformed in the regular course of
civil administration, and not otherwise.
The first view, as has been said, is that which theoretical
writers delight to take, and to enlarge upon, and it is not uncom
mon to assume that our institutions have been reared on the gen
eral intelligence of the people, and that only by the general dif
fusion of intelligence among the people are they to be perpetu
ated. The French philosopher, De Tocqueville, has done much
to flatter our national vanity In this regard, and our own states
men and authors have done more. We lay down the proposi
tion that free institutions can be supported only where general
intelligence prevails ; we support them, and thereby we prove
that we are generally intelligent and wise. This sort of proof is
easy and pleasant, and one of the most agreeable features of it is
that the demonstration may be made by our firesides, or in our
social discussions, and without the necessity of verifying the
proofs by observation of those who actually control our elections
or make our laws. To prove as a fact that the majority of those
who possess the right of suffrage have really given intelligent
thought and reflection to the questions at issue, and have such
knowledge of the principles of government as enables them to
decide wisely between the men and measures presented for their
acceptance, is a task which few men would venture to undertake,
and fewer still would succeed in.
But the voter who is not intelligent has that which both to
him and the country may sometimes be the equivalent. If he is
of American birth and ancestry, he and his ancestors have been
accustomed to co-operation with, and acquiescence in the results of
free institutions, until these have become a habit of mind so firm
and so instinctive, that the suggestion to break away from it nev
er comes to him. He finds himself a part of a working system of
government, the principles of which are in the main traditional ;
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he knows that his ancestors were a part of the same system, that
it was their creation, and that they gloried in their handiwork,
and under it attained to an eminence which made them the envy
of other nations; so that his pride of ancestry and his pride of
country largely center in it ; and he never pauses to compare the
system with any other, or to consider what are its peculiar advan
tages, and whether some other may not have advantages which it
does not embrace. He may not know the meaning of a consti
tution, or have any idea of political science, or of the relations of
counties to States, or of States to each other ; but to his patriotic
attachment these are immaterial : what he does know is that by
and through certain forms the country is ruled, and that periodi
cally he and his neighbors may take part in these forms, and
thereby continue the process of government. Some things may
perhaps displease him, which he would desire to change ; reforms
may be suggested by his political leaders, which seem to him
reasonable, but the question of discarding the system for any
other is never formulated in his mind. Habitually he receives it
as the best the world has ever known, and without a question
in working it. Is not this discipline of habit more condu
cive to the quiet, the orderly, and the safe operation of the ma
chinery of government than any theoretical instruction in politi
cal science, however thorough, can possibly be? What observer
of-public disorders has failed to remark that men well instructed,
but without this discipline, are the men generally most ready to
engage in wild and extravagant ventures in government, and to
promote disorders in order to effect radical changes?
.The men who framed the constitution, then, found a people
thoroughly- trained in self-government ; a political society with a
momentum-in that direction which was certain to continue if not
stayed by some forcible intervention. They found also thirteen
States fully organized on one general plan, and needing only a
stronger bond of union that would enable them to perform their
general duties to their creditors and to other nations, and to secure
themselves against hostile assaults. To supply this bond was the
task to which they directed their deliberations.
In a broad sense the Constitution of the United States em
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braces, not the written charter merely, but
'
the whole' body df
laws properly denominated fundamental. By this we mean that
every citizen of a State, and of the United States,- when he
speaks generally of the constitutional law of his country, does
not limit his conception to the written instrument constituting
the bond of union of all the States, but with the utmost propriety
embraces also the constitutional securities which are thrown
around him by his own State. Unless these are included the
concrete idea of a constitutional system is imperfect and mislead
ing. The whole, taken together and working together, form the'
constitutional structure. And the major part of this structure
was built up for i's in the country of our forefathers, and borne
across the ocean by the settlers at Jamestown, at Plymouth, and
at St. Mary's. - '
Burke in his letter to the Old Whigs has, in forcible language,
brought to the front the chief excellency of the British constitu
tion. " The British Constitution," he says, " has not been struck
out at one heat, by a set of presumptious men, like the assembly
of pettifoggers run mad at Paris.
"Tis not the hasty product of a day,
But the well-ripened fruit of wise delay.'
It is the result of the thoughts of many minds in many ages. It
is no simple, no superficial thing, nor to be estimated by superfi
cial understandings." Every word of this we may appropriate"-;
it is as true for us now as it was true for Great Britain, and if we
are wise it will be true of our institutions always. '-'..!
But with this most valuable, this inherited portion of our con_
stitutional system, the framers of the Federal Constitution' 'had.
nothing to do. It stood before them in all its beauty, ready-made ;
it was upheld and guarded by the people of the States ; in their
charge it belonged, and in their charge it was wisely left. The
members of the convention were neither called on to add to nor to
modify it ; they had before them a labor widely different ; it was
to unite and strengthen states already free ; to give to them the
means of effectual protection for constitutional liberties already
enjoyed. No man among them proposed to build anew from the
beginning;.. they had merely to crown a structure the. arch of
yifhick had been removed when the power of the British crown
»fld tfee British Parliament was rejected. No one proposed that
they should go further than this, and many good and wise men
distrusted their work and refused their approbation until by
amendments the government of the Union had been expressly
prohibited from abridging the traditional rights, which were also
the constitutional rights, of the people of the States. It was no
excessive caution which led men like Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Sam
uel Adams to declare that it was not sufficient that the general
governiraent was one of enumerated powers only ; they expressed
not their own views merely, but the best thought of the land-
when they declared that safety required that these enumerated
powers should be wisely circumscribed by guarantees, so that
encroachments upon the rights of the States, and of the people
of the States, should as far as possible be precluded. Safety
shelters in distrust of power, whether it be power freely conferred
or foreibly taken.
We have no occasion at this time to enter upon a considera
tion of the first twelve amendments to the Federal Constitution.
The first eight were guarantees or securities of individual rights ;
the ninth and tenth were intended to guard and secure the
reserved rights of the States. The eleventh, adopted a little later,
took away the power to bring the States into the Federal courts
at the suit of individuals. The twelfth came in still later to
change the mode of chosing the President and Vice President,
which in the fourth election had proved a delusion and a danger.
The general theory of the American experiment in govern
ment is familiar. If not strictly unique, when examined in the
light of history, it is certain that at the time nothing at all resem
bling it was in existence. It separated sovereign powers, setting
apart certain rights which it specified, and conferring these upon
the government which was newly created. That government and
that alone was to be admitted as a member of the family of
nations ; that alone was to be dealt with by others when the rules
of foreign intercourse were in question, and the tremendous issues
of peace and war to by discussed and determined. The powers
which particularly attract the attention pf the world, and even of
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its own people, were confided to it
,
and in respect to these the States
were subordinated. But the powers left with the States were not
a residuum merely ; they were almost all the general powers of
government ; and it was meant that the people should find in these
the guardians of their rights and the chief protectors of their
liberties.
No care, no caution, no prudent foresight, can fully anticipate
the future in government. The scheme was wise and was ably
developed, but circumstances not foreseen, were unfavorable to a
fair trial of the division of sovereign powers which the scheme
embodied and undertook to make. The difficulty arose at the
very outset, the moment parties began to organize on the question
of the proper construction of the national powers. In the con-'
vention men differed concerning what these should be ; a few dis
trusting an experiment in which the kingly power had no part ;
a larger number standing firmly by State sovereignty' under a con
federation ; and when at length by compromise, a middle ground
was agreed upon, on which men of the diverse views of Madison
and Hamilton could call their followers about them, to cooperate
in the labor of securing the adoption of the constitution, they were
still found looking in opposite directions for safety, 'and their dif
fering views of the instrument they had jointly agreed upon, and
jointly advocated and defended, became the creeds of opposing
political parties.
Parties in free governments should be based upon divisions
in sentiment on great and paramount questions of public policy.'
These questions should be sufficiently important to subordinate
all others; but they should involve questions of policy only, so
'
that the vicissitudes of politics can never disturb the foundations
of the government. It is implied in the existence of parties that
each as it succeeds will give effect, as far as possible, to its party
policy, and the people in bestowing their confidence upon it may
be regarded as commanding that it shall do so. If Gladstone
succeeds the people command peace ; if D'Israeli is supported he
is directed to present, if needful, the grim visage of war. But
the question of the powers conferred by a written constitution
like ours can never be a question of mere policy, and therefore it
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becomes one of danger when it becomes a question of party.
The questions of policy are supposed to have been determined
when the constitution was framed ; it was then agreed after sol
emn deliberation, that it should confer such and such powers, and
no greater, and no other. The constitution was agreed upon as
an unfailing and invariable standard and authority; that was its
purpose ; it was to speak in one voice always ; to utter the same
sounds, to give the same authority, until in the manner agreed
upon in it
,
the command should be changed or the authority mod
ified. To treat its construction and scope as an open question
was to eliminate its central idea ; to divide parties upon it was to
concede that it did not fully accomplish its purpose. For then,
of necessity, it became a variable instrument, and the powers of
government under it must expand and vary as parties succeed
and are overthrown. The written constitution, as a settled and
definite rule of right and of action should in theory be the com
mon ground of parties, upon which all can stand without contest
or controversy ; and the questions of policy which divide parties
should leave this common ground wholly undisturbed, and not har
rowed first this way and then that, to make it present an appearance
that favors the prevailing party. It must he understood that we
speak now of a written constitution only ; for the unwritten con
stitution is in its nature the opposite of this : it is at all times
changeable, and is expected to be and must be ; questions of pol
icy as to what it should be are always open, and determinations
upon such questions are constantly entering into and forming a
part of it. Political parties, therefore, when the constitution is
unwritten and traditional, may with the utmost propriety marshal
their forces with respect to constitutional questions, as they did
in England in respect to the proposed electoral reform of 1832,
and as they have since in respect to many similar controversies.
Of the effect of the division of parties in this country concerning
the construction of the constitution, we shall speak a little
further on.
As a matter of history it may be remarked that for the first
twelve years after the constitution was put in force, the most dem
ocratic of the two parties was profoundly distrustful of the workings
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of government under it
,
and believed its powers were being per
verted to the destruction of liberty, and of the reserved rights of
the States. In this belief the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions
were passed ; resolutions so familiar to us all. For the next four
teen years the least democratic of the two parties appears to have
been penetrated by an equally profound alarm, and some of its
leading members were seriously considering the question of the
advisability of taking their section out of the Union. Then fol
lowed the two presidential terms of Monroe and John Quincy
Adams, of profound quiet, during which the supreme excellence
of the Federal Constitution was an article in the political faith of
every party and faction, and of every political leader. In 1832
came the crisis of nullification, averted by the firmness of the
President, and by a timely compromise on the chief subject of
discontent. For more than a generation after this, until the great
trial of 1861 approached, there was another period in which it
was the policy and the pride of all parties, and all leaders of
parties, to praise to the point of adoration the Federal Constitu
tion. Indeed there had been no cessation of this praise during
the nullification troubles. The President and those who agreed
with him planted themselves upon it; Gen. Hamilton, when he
took his seat as president of the nullification convention, congrat
ulated the country on being governed by an instrument which
afforded so simple and so effectual a remedy for federal wrongs;
there were men who praised it because it protected the system of
labor prevailing at the South ; and others who praised it because
it afforded the means of indirectly assailing that system ; and
there were not wanting those who spoke of it as something deliv
ered to us by a species of divine inspiration, like the law delivered
to the Hebrews when they came up out of Egypt. As one
writer has it
, " it was God's saving gift to a distracted and imper
iled peopled."
Prof. Von Hoist, the most able, if not the most favorable of
our foreign critics, has made this excessive laudation a subject of
reproach and ridicule, but it deserves neither the one nor the other.
True patriotism always runs to excess, and from the standpoint of
another people is always ridiculous ; but it is nevertheless, the
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bathe<
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highest national virtue, and should be admired in proportion as
it attaches itself to that which to others seems least attractive. globe.
The Jewish law-giver promised his followers in the land to which dnecti
he was leading them, a land flowing with milk and honey, and wars'
in this excellence they boasted, though we know that these are len or
products which are to be had not specially in fertile regions, but
wherever the soil can nourish the humble grasses. If our con
stitution is suited to our condition, it is political wisdom to praise ™ ter
it ; the nation is strengthened, order is secured, outbreaks against "'
the law are rendered improbable, discontents are kept down, and >*rei
the happiness of the people increased in proportion as they be- be nn
lieve in the excellence of their institutions. Doubt on that point amen
is a great national evil \ it induces discontent; it invites to exper- writti
iments in government ; it breaks up the conservative force which and f
alone can protect against rashness and disorder. Even if the in- State
stitutions of the people are known to be defective, it is safer that thele
their amendment should fall to the hands of those who unduly woul
revere and cherish them, rather than of those who cannot appre- marl
ciate their real merits. The former will at least preserve the all g
foundations ; with the latter the foundations are likely to be the liber
objects of chief assault. to m
At the very outset the constitution was put to a severe test, (Jem-
growing out of the impoverished condition of the people, and (Wv
of the pressure upon them of enormous public and pri- fur^
vate debts. For a time civil war was threatened, but the pru- SU(]C
dence, the wisdom, and the humanity of the executive averted
the evil. The proposed dismemberment of the Union in 1814
merits little attention, except as it shows that projects of the sort
have not been confined to one section or to one school of consti- u
tutional interpretation. The evidence is abundant that it received m
little encouragement, and those who were even suspected of favor
ing it, were driven into private life and obscurity when the sec
ond war with Groat Britain was brought to such a conclusion as
we might regard with reasonable complacency. For more than
sixty years until the difficulties growing out of the controversy
over the institution of slavery began to jportend civil war, the
people of the United States probably enjoyed a larger proportion
natu
in n
ca.
Mr
d
e
g
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Fee
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of general content and happiness than any other people on the
globe. England, meantime, had made wonderful advance in the
direction of civil liberty, but she had suffered greatly in foreign
wars, and her statistics of poverty were appalling.
' Several of the
ten or twelve revolutions which had taken place in France had
bathed the streets of her principal cities with blood, and one had
been so frightful in its character that it is still known as the reign
of terror.
Recurring again to the theory of the government that was to
be reared on the written constitution, we have seen that it was to
be unchangeable, except as changes were brought in by express
amendment. The stipulations agreed upon and introduced in the
written instrument are to mean the same thing to day, to-morrow,
and forever ; they are formulated in order to fasten the ship of
State to certain definite moorings ; that is their purpose. Never
theless, the fear that changes which would belie this theory
would creep in was manifest from the first. " It has been re--
marked," said Mr. Madison, in 1778,
;'
that there is a teudency in
all governments to an augmentation of power at the expense of
liberty. But the remark as generally understood does not seem
to me to be well founded. Power, when it has attained a certain
degree of energy and independence, goes on generally to further
degrees. But when below that degree the direct tendency is to
further degrees of relaxation, until the abuses of liberty beget a
sudden transition to an undue degree of power. With this expla
nation the remark may be true ; and in the latter sense only is it
in my opinion, applicable to the existing governments in Ameri
ca. It is a melancholy. reflection," he adds, " that liberty should
be equally exposed to danger whether the government have too
much or too little power, and that the line which divides these
extremes should be so inaccurately defined by experience."
Now the government of the United States was below the
degree of self-protecting energy while the Articles of Confed
eration remained in force, but it attained at a bound to due energ}-
and independence under the administration of Washington with
Hamilton for its master spirit, and under the construction of the
Federal Supreme Court, presided over by Jay and Marshall,
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The result followed as a perfectly natural, if not necessary result
of the party ascendency of the statesmen of the school of liberal
construction, and the filling of the most important offices by men
of the like political faith. All the advocates of the constitution
had put forward as the principal check upon undue power in the
federal Government, the influence of the individual States in
preserving the balance of constitutional powers. This reliance
proved utterly futile. The expected results were not realized
because the central government always, or nearly always, had
within its control the means of giving to its own action para
mount force. This was so because the final decision upon the 1
measure of federal authority would always, through one or the '
other of its departments, be made by the federal Government '
itself. So lcng as this was the case it was idle to expect that '
federal action could meet with any effective check from the
action of the separate States. If foreign territory was annexed !
contrary to the conviction of constitutional right prevailing in any '
State, how was it possible for the State, as such to interpose ? If
a national bank was chartered and the federal court sustained
the power, or if the same court extended its maritime jurisdiction
into the forests of the Northwest and Southwest, what effective
means had the State to prevent ? We speak of the conclusions
in none of these cases, as questioning their correctness ; concede
them to be sound, and the fact remains that had they been wholly
and palpably otherwise, the final result must have been the same,
and the federal jurisdiction would have been increased to the
extent of the power actually assumed and exercised.
But if a strengthening of federal power should go on under
Washington and Adams, should not the action be reversed when
Mr. Jefferson as the representative of the opposite school of con
struction became President? Paradoxical as it may appear, and
inconsistent with the ordinary workings of party government, this
question must be answered in the negative. The reason is to be
found in the nature of the questions on which parties divided, and
it presents in a strong light the misfortune, and I may say the
danger of a party division on questions that concern the very con
stitution itself. .Change under such circumstances must always
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be in one direction. What seems usurpation when regarded from
the standpoint of private life, takes on a new appearance when
viewed from the chair of state. No government is likely to
abandon ground already occupied and conceded to it by compe
tent authority or by acquiescence. When the party of strict con
struction succeeds the party of liberal construction, it takes up
the reins of government with the wheels in motion, and a beaten
track before it
,
and it is too much to expect of human nature that
men will deliberately reject and refuse to enjoy a legacy of dig
nity, importance and power, which, if wrongfully acquired by
predecessors, has come without wrong on their part, to their
hands. At most, what can be expected of the new administra
tion is this : that it will apply its own principles in its own future
action ; and when its opponents again recover power, the process
of liberal construction and acquisition will go on as before. Thus
the pendulum, when it moves at all, can only move one wav ; if
it pause, it establishes a new perpendicular at that point ; and
when it moves again it will only be by a return of the same force,
impelling it in the same direction as before. It has been truly
remarked by Mr. Hamilton's most recent biographer, speaking of
the period when the influence of that statesman was paramount
in public affairs, that " the history of the country shows that the
strength, the centralization, the consolidation conferred by feder
alism upon the national government, has been not only fully main
tained without long continued or serious interruption to the pres
ent day, but that as a reult of the action of that period, these
characteristics have been largely developed." Von Hoist justly
says that nothing different was to be expected.
The federal power also received a powerful impetus in 1839,
under the administration of General Jackson, when, perhaps,
least of all it was to be expected, because this President not only
represented the school of strict construction, but to some extent
he proposed to and did make war upon and defy what he regarded
as aggressions of federal judicial power. The impulse referred
to came from no deliberate purpose, but was the result of a most
unfortunate policy under which the country is still suffering, and
from which it in vain struggles. tore.Heve itself. I refer to the
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degrading and corrupting policy which makes offices of all
classes and grades, the lawful spoils in political warfare. If it be
asked why this s ould, or how it can affect the relative extent of
state and federal power, the following reasons may be assigned :
1. The number of offices which ambitious men aspire to,
and desire to possess, is greater under the Federal Government
than it is under the States. Moreover there is none so high under
a State the incumbent of which cannot look up to one higher
under the Federal Government, and therefore the chief attractions
for ambitious men are always to be found within the limits of
federal not of state jurisdiction.
2. The organization of political parties is upon Federal, not
upon state questions, and makes every thing center around
Federal elections, leaving the State elections as a rule quite sub
ordinate. In a Presidential election it is not only the offices of
President and Vice President, of representative in Congress, and
perhaps senator, that are at stake, but in the presidency there are
involved all the foreign ministers and consuls, the marshals, the
postmasters, the collectors, and other officers in the customs and
internal revenue service, and several thousand clerks, besides the
officers of the territories. The immediate support and the pros
pective comfort of some sixty or eighty thousand families are
dependent upon the result of the election, and every member of
these is looking with trembling apprehension beyond the State to
the Federal government as the source from which the desired
blessings or the dreaded calamities are to come.
3. These circumstances beget a habit of mind not only on
the part of office-holders and office-seekers, but of all others who
enlist warmly in general elections, which unconsciously, perhaps,
but most certainly subordinates the States to the Union whenever
any question of relative jurisdiction arises. The consequence is
this : let a question of power arise as between Congress and one
of the States, or a conflict of jurisdiction between a Federal and
a State court, or between a Federal marshal and a State officer,
and almost instinctively it is assumed in the public mind that the
rightful authority must be on the part of the body, court or offi
cer claiming under the Federal, that is to say, the superior juris*
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diction. Moreover, the chief organs of political intelligence in
the country receive their chief inspiration in or about the nation
al capital, and their writers gradually fall into the same habit of
of thought. Whoever disputes a claim of Federal jurisdiction
finds himself under the necessity of removing a presumption
which at the outset exists in men's minds against him.
Perhaps incredulity may be expressed here at the suggestion,
that when we have a written constitution fixing and defining the
exact limits of power, these can be moved back and forth by any
existing public opinion. The concession will here be very freely
made that they ought not to be ; but it is nevertheless asserted
that a general public sentiment will find its expression. It
may solve a doubt that otherwise might exist in Con
gress concerning its own jurisdiction ; it may lead us, as it many
times has, to an acquiescence in the exercise of doubtful powers,
and thus beget precedents ; and it induces a higher and more con
fident tone in the assertion of Federal authority as against that of
the States. It is impossible that these circumstances should not
have their influence ; they do and they will until the public ser
vice is restored to its primitive purity as it existed under the ear
lier presidents, and to some extent, even afterwards.
Then some powerful interests may lead in the same direction.
To illustrate with the telegraph : it is strongly urged in some
quarters that the United States should exercise the authority to
take possession of all the lines in the country under its power to
establish post-offices and post-roads. The case of railroads is a
still better illustration. Here two powerful and antagonistic
interests have already shown some disposition to demand of the
general government the same thing ; namely, that it shall take
control of the railroads under its power over commerce. The
owners of the roads seem inclined to ask it
,
that they may obtain
in the Federal Government a more effectual protection than they
now find in some of the states. The laboring and agricultural
interests on the other hand seem inclined to demand it in order
that they may find in the general government a power sufficiently
strong to bring the great corporations under proper subjection
and control. It is of no importance to our subject whether one
B
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or the other class is likely to be disappointed in its expectations. .t:
The important consideration is this : that if the government •
assumes control of the railways it will thereby increase largely f.
its relative power and influence, and diminish in proportion the , i
power and iuftuence of the individual States. .,
Other illustrations might be given, but we forbear. It is
.
» ' . m r.
enough that we have pointed out that the Federal Constitution, ,
. . . . ,
' anQ
though it is the same in words, is not, as a living and elfective
instrument, the same to-day that it was when made. There has ,
. , thai
been change and there will be change, whether we approve and , .
assent to it or not. " I have been in public life," said Judge
Story at one time, " nearly forty years, and have seen great
changes in the country. Men flatter themselves that now at
least all is settled ; but no, our . laws are written on the sands of
time, and the winds of popular opinion gradually efface them ;
new laws are to be made, and your old writing renewed or
changed." Writers of an opposite school, and particularly John
Taylor of Virginia, recognized this fact as distinctly as did Judge
Story ; and though he protested against it
,
and sought to hold
the Federal Government to what he believed were its true moor
ings, he struggled, and he knew he struggled in vain. Indeed
there never has been in the history of the world such a thing as
a stationary constitution ; and if it were possible to establish an P01
exception, the circumstances already alluded to would preclude
'"
it in the case of our own. nen
We have quoted from Mr. Madison an expression of his ma-v
views tiiat the power of the Union was likely to advance or m
recede according as it attained or failed to attain the requisite sent
vigor for self-protection. Mr. Hamilton's views were not essen
tially difleerent, but he put forward more prominently the cir
cumstances that would incline the people to side with their ™P«
respective States in any contest with the federal head. The ev'er
special reasons he assigned for his belief were, that the national s«lui
representatives would naturally sympathize with the State rather dwa
than with the federal power ; that the interests regulated and 1
controlled by the State would always be most numerous and most fores
directly affecting the interests of the people, and that " the ope- they
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rations of the national government on the other hand, falling less
immediately under the observation of the mass of the citizens,
the benefits derived from it will chiefly be perceived and attended
to by speculative men. Relating to niore general interests, they
will be less apt to come home to the feelings of the people ; and,
in proportion, less likely to inspire a habitual sense of obligation,
and an active sense of attachment."
These were Mr. Hamilton's reasons. We have already seen
that abundant reasons exist why representatives in Congress find
their ambitious aims gratified in the line of federal rather than of
state authority. Reasons equally powerful might be assigned
why the business interests of the country have their attention
drawn in the same direction when special benefits are looked
for Thus, government for its needs levies imposts ; in doing
this it has power to discriminate so as to give special assistance
to particular interests. How insignificant now would be all that
a State could do for the powerful iron interests within its limits
in comparison with what might be done for them by a single
paragraph 'in a revenue act of Congress ! The Congress may
coin money and regulate the value thereof At a blow and by a
stretch of power it annililates all state banking, and concentrates
upon itself the attention of the whole banking interest of the
country. It is difficult to over-estimate what the general govern
ment gained and what the States lost by this simple act, but it
may perhaps be equalled by what may be done with the currency
in the present crisis. Every man in the nation, from the repre
sentative of the Union abroad, who feels that the national honor
is involved in a possible debasement of the currency, to the
homesteader in distant territories, who thinks the little he has
depends upon some measure that shall render money abundant —
every one of them all is looking far beyond state affairs to the
solution of the engrossing national financial problem which now
dwarfs all state controversies.
Then some non-political events which could not have been
foreseen, have assisted this tendency while at the same time
they have contributed to make it less objectionable. By the aid
of railroads the people of =New Hampshire and Georgia arc
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now as proximate to the national capital as the people in their
outlying parishes were to their State capitals ninety years ago.
Their intercourse with Washington is greater now than it was
with their respective State capitols then. But by the aid of the
telegraph this is vastly increased ; and the familiarity of the peo
ple with what takes place at the political heart of the nation, is
so far beyond what they could know of their own State affairs
at that time as to render comparison difficult. Were a constitu
tion to be newly formed now, this facility of intercourse and com
munication could not fail to be regarded of high importance in
its bearing upon a distribution of powers as between the Union
and the several States. The facility with which those who are to
exercise the trust of government can be watched and supervised
by their constituents, is always of high importance, and would be
likely at this time to favor the federal power.
I shall venture to name one other cause for the accretion of
federal power, which attracts no attention and is nevertheless of
considerable force. I refer to the natural disposition of mankind
to oppose and resist that which does not please them, and in re
spect to which there may be an appeal to some other authority
with possibility of reversing what they dislike, though they would
submit, with little or no protest, to things equally disagreeable
emanating from the authority of the last resort, -ir in respect to
which the remedy was not only doubtful but distant. The judge
of the first instance, though equally able and fair, will be the
subject of more sharp and acrimonious criticism than the judge
of final resort. The judge of short term will find people labor
ing to unseat him and industriously working up an opposition for
opinions which would be submitted to with only temporary grum
bling if he held for life, because anything beyond grumbling
would then be idle. It is'the elective judge to whom the thorny
seat is assigned ; and for the reasons suggested the State judge
is often made the target for assaults which the Federal judge
escapes.. Like reasons lead people, dissatisfied with State juris
diction, to seek redress from the federal power, and the
temptation to invite it beyond its limits is not only alwavs present
but often influential.
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Of this principle I may give an illustration in state legislation.
Until within the last twenty years or so the city of New York
was having the usual experience of American cities, and was
governing itself with perhaps no more disorder or discontent,
in proportion to its size, than others. But to remedy such evils
as existed, the citizens "appealed to the legislature to take the
government into its own hands, and administer it through com
missions. The local evils were at once and very largely increased -:
we might almost use a mathematical figure, and say, they in
creased in proportion to the distance of the governing authority
from the field of its operations. As they grew and were
developed, the people appealed again and again to Albany,
until at last it was discovered that the city had been placed by
the legislature, but at the request of its own citizens, in the hands
of a daring banditti, who robbed under the forms of law, and had
the sanction of the courts for their plunder. It was a bitter les
son, and it ought to be a permanent one.
In mentioning the causes for the increase of federal power,
we have said nothing of the civil war. It was scarcely necessary
to speak of it
,
because the suggestion arises spontaneously to
every mind that a war in which the government is making tre
mendous exertion of force, must have powerful influence in that
direction. But the circumstances gave this a special and extra
ordinary influence. Our civil war was not like those of England
in the 17th century, in which the division of parties pervaded all
the counties and boroughs of the realm, but State stood over
against State ; the habit of obedience to recognized authority,
which has already been alluded to, holding each State together
when its convention took its stand, irrespestive of the private
sentiments ot the people. The war thus assumed the form of the
government reducing refractory States to subordination, and em
ploying for that purpose all the men and all the means of the
people in new ways, and some of them, as in the case of legal
tender notes, questionable ways ; and its conclusive success put
the supremacy of the Union over the States before the minds and
imaginations of the people in the most vivid and striking light
possible, Unfortunately too, for a time after the war was over, it
' w'-m^s
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was deemed necessary to retain the States lately in rebellion
under military control ; so that the appearance presented to the
unthinking mind was that of dependent provinces with derivative
powers, rather than of Sovereign States with the inherent and
general powers which the constitution left to the States assenting
to it.
Perhaps there will be those who, in view of the gradual con
solidation and strengthening of federal power, and the gradual
expansion of constitutional stipulations to accommodate new
exegencies and new views, will be ready to demand, " What is
the value of words and stipulations if in the course of time they
grow to have a meaning which originally was not supposed to be
in them ? or why should we discuss the limitations and restraints
of a constitution if they neither limit nor restrain?" Questions
of this sort are sometimes asked by dissatisfied and despondent
persons, who think they perceive in the movements of govern
mental forces a steady drifting, not only towards centralization
and a complete subordination of the States to the nation even
in our internal affairs, but also towards a state of things when an
ambitious usurper may gradually and almost imperceptibly lay
his grasp upon the reins of power, and renew in America the
story of republics the world over. But there has been no purpose
to advance the idea in what has thus far been said that stipula
tions do not restrain, or that constitutions are mere bands of
straw for parties to break. The truth we have endeavored
to inculcate is, that parties cannot make the construction of
the written constitution the gage of conflict, each seeking
to make it accommodate party purposes and desires, and still
find it unstrained and unaffected by the struggles over it
, when they
have been continued for three generations, and at times under
circumstances the most novel and exciting that could well be
conceived. We state the fact, which history does not permit us
to question, and deduce as best we may, the lesson from it.
Government is the primal fact of society. In some form every
generation receives it from its predecessors and must make the
best of it, for present use and for transmission. We find ours, as
it now exists, different in some respects from what was contem
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plated by those who formed it
,
but whether changed for better or
for worse is only a matter for speculation. Hamilton, when he
proposed the assumption of State debts to strengthen the general
government, thought he was doing his country a valuable and
lasting service. Many of those who favored Mr. Jefferson's
purchase of Louisiana refused to consider the question of consti
tutional right, because they said this is a matter of necessity, and
we cannot allow it to be controlled by nice scruples of constitu
tional law. Mr. Chase, as Secretary of the Treasury, supervised
and carried out a system— if he did not originate it—which
afterwards as judge, he declared unwarranted by the constitution
he had sworn to support. And although many able lawyers
advised Mr. Lincoln that he might rightfully suspend the privi
lege of the habeas corpus, it is not believed that for a moment he
thought so, though under the pressure of a supposed necessity he
assumed the power. These are facts we cannot overlook when
questions of the boundaries of power are being examined.
The German professor who has recently treated with such full
ness of information and on such maturity of reflection our con
stitutional history evidently regards every measure taken to
strengthen the Federal at the expense of the State governments as
something right in itself, as tending to a consolidation of order,
and to the termination of a system of divided sovereignty which
is false, illogical, and in its tendencies anarchical. But Von
Hoist does not, as we believe, fully sympathise with, or fully un
derstand the liberty which we sometimes call Anglo-Saxon, and
whose characteristic is, to trust as much as is safe to the individ
ual, and as little as is safe to the government. It is a legitimate
sequence of this principle that the authorities nearest to and most
directly controlled by the individual, should be most generouslv
trusted with appropriate powers. With this experience as a race
our duty as American citizens to suppo.it and abide by the ap
portionment of authority which has been solemnly agreed upon,
seems as plain in point of policy as it is in point of constitutional
obligation. We may believe the landmarks have been moved by
those who have gone before us, but this does not relieve us of the
obligation to make the government we receive accomplish the
'
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proper purposes of government. One great truth we are per
haps too liable to overlook, namely, that the political sea is one
of perpetual unrest; there are no calms when we may lazily
rest upon our oars, and rejoice in the mere pleasure of an exist
ence devoid of doubt and care. For thirty years now the politics
of our own country have been peculiarly tempestuous and dis
heartening. Clouds gathered around the deathbeds of Calhoun,
Clay, Benton, Cass ; even Webster, whose voice above all the
clangor of party strife had been heard in behalf of the Union and
of constitutional obligation, had also passed away in doubt and
perplexity, and others still nearer our own day followed him
without perceiving that the clouds were lifting. But the nation
survives, and with it survives the duty of the citizen to make its
government fulfill the purposes of its creation. If the decisions
of competent authorities ; if the irresistible current of public
events ; even if what we may believe to be the usurpations or
abuses of men in power have given to the movements of govern
ment a deflection from the line marked out for its operations, the
duty is not thereby made less apparent or imperative. We cannot
in mid ocean discard the vessel we are launched upon, because we
believe the officers have departed from the correct course laid
down on the chart, or have recklessly encountered storms that
might have been avoided. The past is the field from which we
may gather wisdom for the exigencies of the future ; to cultivate
it for a harvest of vain regrets would be to the individual folly
to the statesman madness. " In regard to this country," said Mr.
Webster, " there is no poetry like the poetry of events, and all
prophecies lag behind their fulfillment." What reason is there
for believing that this is any more true of the first century of the
republic than it will be of the second ? " I am persuaded," said
Mr. Jefferson, " no constitution was ever before so well calculated
as ours for extensive empire and self-government." Extensive
empire it already embraces ; the problem of self-government
under it has assumed a new phase, but it is certainly not less
hopeful now than when Jefferson wrote, with the prospect in view
of a war with Great Britain, carried on by a divided people, or
when Webster spoke encouraging words with the desperate strug
gle over slavery looming up in the near future.
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That great struggle is now over, and the issue involved is
safely settled on an enduring and righteous basis. Whether we
believe our governmeut to be the better or the worse for the great
and steady changes which have been going on in its effective
structure, is of little importance to our duties as citizens of the
republic. It is still our government : a great and growing people
is happy in the enjoyment of life and liberty under its protection ;
and the sun that to-day smiles so joyously upon reviving nature,
is not more profuse in its promises of vernal flowers and au
tumnal harvests, than are the institutions we live under of pros
perity and contentment to the people. Let it be ours in our sev
eral spheres to assist in making these promises ripen into a frui
tion as striking and as beneficient as the country itself is great
and glorious.
